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We are pleased to inform you that the 57th annual Chapel Hill Colloquium in Philosophy will take place from Friday afternoon, September 19th-20th, 2025 on UNC Chapel Hill's campus. Registration is closed at this time and we will no longer be accepting registration requests.
Friday, September 19th (Howell Hall, Room 115)
2:30-4:30pm
Justin Snedegar (University of Virginia): Friendly Criticism
Comments by Jessica Isserow (University of Notre Dame)
Chair: Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Duke University)
Tea Break
5:00-7:00pm
Julia Jorati (University of Massachusetts, Amherst): Reparations for Transatlantic Slavery: Early Modern Arguments
Comments by Stephen Ferguson (North Carolina State University)
Chair: Keshav Singh (University of Alabama at Birmingham)
7:30-9:30pm
Dinner Reception at The Story Venue
Saturday, September 20th (Murphey Hall, Room 116)
10:00am-12:00pm
Justin Clarke-Doane (Columbia University): The Metatheoretic Dependence of Physical Theories
Comments by William D’Alessandro (College of William and Mary)
Chair: Thomas Hofweber (UNC Chapel Hill)
Lunch Break
2:30-4:30pm
Dmitri Gallow (University of Southern California): You Are Blameworthy for the Negative Effects of Your Moral Flaws
Comments by Reuben Stern (Duke University)
Chair: Jennifer Jhun (Duke University)
Tea Break
5:30-7:00pm
The Claire Miller Lecture
John Norton (University of Pittsburgh): How the Material Theory of Induction Dissolves the Problem of Induction
Hume's problem of induction, in its modern formulations, asserts that no universal rule of inductive inference can be justified since all such attempts are circular or trigger an infinite regress of rules. The material theory of induction has no universal rules of inductive inference. The warrants for inductive inferences are supplied by background facts. Hume's problem is thereby dissolved since there are no universal rules of inductive inference to be justified. I will argue that attempts to revive the problem within the material theory fail.
