Event Details
Event Title 57th UNC Chapel Hill Colloquium in Philosophy
Location TBA
Sponsor Philosophy
Date/Time 09/19/2025 - 09/20/2025 2:30 PM - 9:30 PM
Event Price
Cutoff Date 09/12/2025 Must register before this date
For more information, contact the event administrator: Caitlin Staton cjsatunc@unc.edu
Sorry, This event has expired
 
We are pleased to inform you that the 57th annual Chapel Hill Colloquium in Philosophy will take place from Friday afternoon, September 19th-20th, 2025 on UNC Chapel Hill's campus. Registration is closed at this time and we will no longer be accepting registration requests.

 Friday, September 19th
(Howell Hall, Room 115)

2:30-4:30pm

Justin Snedegar (University of Virginia): Friendly Criticism

Comments by Jessica Isserow (University of Notre Dame)

Chair: Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Duke University)


Tea Break


5:00-7:00pm

Julia Jorati (University of Massachusetts, Amherst): Reparations for Transatlantic Slavery: Early Modern Arguments

Comments by Stephen Ferguson (North Carolina State University)

Chair: Keshav Singh (University of Alabama at Birmingham)


7:30-9:30pm

Dinner Reception at The Story Venue

 

Saturday, September 20th
(Murphey Hall, Room 116)

10:00am-12:00pm

Justin Clarke-Doane (Columbia University): The Metatheoretic Dependence of Physical Theories

Comments by William D’Alessandro (College of William and Mary)

Chair: Thomas Hofweber (UNC Chapel Hill)


Lunch Break


2:30-4:30pm

Dmitri Gallow (University of Southern California): You Are Blameworthy for the Negative Effects of Your Moral Flaws

Comments by Reuben Stern (Duke University)

Chair: Jennifer Jhun (Duke University)


Tea Break


5:30-7:00pm

The Claire Miller Lecture

John Norton (University of Pittsburgh): How the Material Theory of Induction Dissolves the Problem of Induction

Hume's problem of induction, in its modern formulations, asserts that no universal rule of inductive inference can be justified since all such attempts are circular or trigger an infinite regress of rules. The material theory of induction has no universal rules of inductive inference. The warrants for inductive inferences are supplied by background facts. Hume's problem is thereby dissolved since there are no universal rules of inductive inference to be justified. I will argue that attempts to revive the problem within the material theory fail.

Chair: Alexander Rosenberg (Duke University)


7:30-9:30pm

Dinner Reception at The Ackland Art Museum